Independent trials and tests are also conducted before operational workups to assess basic drills and safety procedures (Oxenbould 2004). The Melbourne–Voyager collision, also referred to as the "Melbourne–Voyager incident" or simply the "Voyager incident", was a collision between two warships of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN); the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (R21) and the destroyer HMAS Voyager (D04).. On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two … Inherited traditions shaped the culture and young adolescent officers were indoctrinated into the naval way of thinking and acting during their four year education at the Royal Australian Naval College. [25] This commission was directed primarily to investigate the immediate causes of the collision, and the circumstances which led up to it. [56] The navigational lights aboard Melbourne may have been dimmed (there is disagreement on this point), and experimental red floodlights on the flight deck may have been seen and misinterpreted as a port-side navigation light. The HMAS Voyager Survivors Association, in memory of those that served upon her and those that were lost in 1964. Oxenbould (2004) asserts that the insufficient lookout onVoyager, criticised in both Commissions, was the main reason the ‘collision was not prevented’. Anderson, D., 1993, The Voyager disaster: a 30 year saga, Issues brief number 6, Parliamentary Research Service, Canberra. "HMAS. Hence, while the primary cause can only be speculated on, the collision had clear implications for the standards of the OOW and Command Team training and preparation. It also reviews improvements to Officer of the Watch (OOW) standards, Command Team training and operational procedures. Oxenbould, Christopher. On the night of Monday, 10th February 1964, the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne (II) collided with the destroyer HMAS Voyager (II) while engaged in night flying exercises off the New South Wales coast. Both investigations were drawn out, controversial and a source of additional pain (Frame 2005). Source:News Corp Australia. By MIDN Mollie Burns, RAN – NEOC 54 Naval Historical Society Prizewinning Essay. pp. In addition to procedural changes, the collision eventually forced the somewhat-reluctant RAN through positive cultural change (Chapman 1979). Professor Rob McLaughlin & his expert panel of Judge Sylvia Emmett, Professor Tom Frame & Commodore Brian Robertson discuss the legal aftermath of the tragic sinking of the destroyer HMAS Voyager in a collision with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. HMAS Voyager was a Daring class destroyer of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), that was lost in a collision in 1964.. In later years, many compensation cases were raised and, since 1964, the RAN has improved greatly in this field (Anderson 1993). It is likely this inexperience and unfamiliarity contributed in some way to the collision. These recordings can be accessed through Apple iTunes or for Android users, Stitcher. (1982). In addition, Frame (1992) states the RAN was under pressure to prove herself to the two major allies, the Royal Navy and United States Navy. [17] Once offloaded, the two SAR boats rejoined the search effort: although all survivors were located within fifteen minutes and rescued, searches continued until well into 11 February. [7][49] In the immediate aftermath of the collision, there were thought to be five possible causes:[50], The equipment failure, inadequate training, and miscalculated sea room theories were disproven by the two Royal Commissions, leaving the suggestion that either a communication error aboard one of the ships caused Voyager to manoeuvre in an undesired manner, or the officers aboard Voyager were incorrectly aware of their vessel's position in relation to the much larger aircraft carrier. [6], During the early part of the evening, Voyager had no difficulties maintaining her position during the manoeuvres both ships performed. A range of measures were introduced after the collision to address the deficiencies that became evident. [31] Robertson submitted his resignation from the Navy on 10 September 1964, two days after receiving official notice of his new posting. communications between the two vessels did not reflect the ships' intentions. The consequential falls in recruiting demonstrated the lack of faith in the RAN (Frame 1992). [62] However, insufficient time was allowed for Voyager to get clear of Melbourne before turning back to port, so instead of passing behind Melbourne, the destroyer passed in front. Safety, constant improvement and professional discipline became key goals. [16][17] Arriving just before 10:00 pm, Air Nymph collected 34 survivors and attempted to transfer them to Melbourne, but after swells pushed the boat up under the carrier's flight deck and damaged two communications aerials, the SAR boat was sent back to Creswell to offload. The bow of HMAS Melbourne after the collision with HMAS Voyager. [41] It found that Stevens was medically unfit for command, and that some of the findings of the first Royal Commission were therefore based on incorrect assumptions. Rear Admiral Gatacre, Galfrey, G, O. It also highlighted numerous weaknesses and OOW standards, Command Team training and operational procedures were improved as a result. This required Voyage… This involves how information is communicated immediately after the incident, the transparency of the investigation process and any actions taken as a result. [4], HMAS Voyager was the first of three Australian-built Daring class destroyers. Naval Historical Society of Australia Inc. [51] The signal was "Foxtrot Corpen 020 22", meaning that Melbourne was about to commence flying operations on a heading of 020°, at a speed of 22 knots (41 km/h; 25 mph), and that Voyager was to assume the plane guard station. [47] Navy Minister Don Chipp has suggested this as an explanation for the contradictory impressions created in the minds of witnesses who reported on Captain Stevens' apparent state of health and demeanour prior to the collision. The RAN swimming standards were raised in response and escape and rescue procedures strengthened and practised (Ferry 2014). [5] This required Voyager to maintain a position astern of and to port of Melbourne at a distance of 1,500 to 2,000 yards (1,400 to 1,800 m; 4,500 to 6,000 ft). Mr Justice Kenneth Asprey, and The Hon. The Navy itself was primarily directed by the increasingly powerful Naval Board (Frame 1992). On 10 February 1964, Voyager was performing trials in Jervis Bay, under the command of Captain Duncan Stevens, following the Williamstown refit. Secondary considerations included the suitability of both ships for the exercise, and the rescue and treatment of survivors. Such exercises would be practiced in the daylight hours initially after graduation from simpler manoeuvres; from this perspective the Melbourne-Voyagerexercise program has little apparent preparation and seems overly ambitious. [9] Both ships' measures were too late to avoid a collision; Melbourne struck Voyager at 8:56 pm.[10]. 5–16. In attendance at the service was Pedro Rich, a former Warrant Officer Physical Trainer who received the British Empire Medal for Gallantry for his actions the night HMAS Voyager sank. On 10th February 1964 the Search and Rescue (SAR) crews arrived at the Marine Section at the usual time, 0750, to have their coffee and prepare for another day’s work. [11] The destroyer's forward section sank quickly, due to the weight of the two 4.5-inch gun turrets. Following any major change in Command Team, such drills are conducted before a ship goes to sea to ensure cohesion, competency and efficiency on the bridge (Oxenbould 2004). HMAS Voyager: the cruel legacy, 1992, Four Corners, Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC). Consequently, RAN officers were very familiar with naval practices but less so with civilian procedures. 103–10. Oxenbould, C., 2004, The Sinking of HMAS Voyager: What Happened?, The Sydney Papers, 16 (2), p 103-110. A NEW book details the greatest political and military cover-up in Australian history — the HMAS Voyager disaster. That one RAN ship could effectively slice another in half with such a loss of life in home waters during peacetime was shocking (Four Corners, ABC Television, 10 February 1992). Freckelton, Ian (2004). This essay examines the impact such serious incidents have on the public and parliamentary perception of the RAN, and the impact it had internally. ANMM Collection Gift from M W J Hallen Even more unfair though has been the action of one of the main law firms acting on behalf of the men – a case against them is being heard today of allegations of gross … Two Royal Commissions were held to investigate the incident. [9], Animation showing the courses and positions of the two ships leading up to the collision, At 8:55 pm, with Voyager still turning to port, Melbourne's Navigation Officer ordered the carrier's engines to half speed astern, which Captain Robertson increased to full astern a few seconds later. On the evening of 10 February 1964, the two ships were performing manoeuvres off Jervis Bay, when Voyager sailed under Melbourne's bow. [17] Another 36 were collected by Air Sprite and transported ashore. The first studied the circumstances of the collision, while the second focused on claims by a former Voyager senior officer that the destroyer's captain was unfit for command. 64 talking about this. On 10 February 1964, Voyager was performing trials off Jervis Bay, under the command of Captain Duncan Stevens, following the Williamstown refit. [19] Duchess was accepted and modernised, and as she was only intended to be in RAN service for four years (although she was later sold to the RAN and served until 1977), the RAN ordered the construction of two improved Australian River class destroyer escorts (British Type 12 frigates), based on the Leander-class frigate design. The RAN had not assisted itself in responding to these queries by becoming an increasingly insular organisation (Frame 2005). [26] The Spicer Report was released publicly on 26 August 1964. While the RAN expected a Naval Board of Inquiry, public and parliamentary mistrust, frustration at the information flow and the need for an impartial review resulted in a Royal Commission being convened (Frame 1992). [3] The carrier was commissioned into the RAN on 28 October 1955. [29] When reporting on the contribution of Melbourne and those aboard her to the collision, Spicer specifically indicated failures of Robertson and two other bridge officers, as they did not alert Voyager to the danger she was in, and appeared to not take measures to prevent Melbourne from colliding. [19] She remained in service with the RAN until 1982, and was sold for scrap to China in 1985. AE2 – Stoker’s Submarine, Musical Composition by Lieutenant Matthew Klohs RAN. [34][35] On 18 May 1967, Prime Minister Harold Holt announced a second Royal Commission into the Melbourne-Voyager collision, with Sir Stanley Burbury, The Hon. Just 51 years ago the destroyer HMAS Voyager was cut in two by the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne with the loss of 82 lives. HMAS Melbourne/Voyager Collision: Cause Theories and Inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E Evans collision) By CoMMoDore DaVID ferry 0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 Turning Circles Voyager, 1000 yds (10 deg rudder) 850 yrds (15 deg rudder) Melbourne, 2800 yds Speed Averages Voyager… The lack of accountability and action by the RAN disgusted Parliament and the public. As the first of the Daring class of destroyer entering Royal Australian Navy service, she had an extensive trials and workup period, spending the first eleven months of her career in Australian waters.Captain 'Buster' Crabb was fiercely and p… Faith in the RAN’s competency is lessened when serious incidents occur. Furthermore, Oxenbould (2004) argues the inexperience of the both bridge teams in working together on their respective ships also contributed. Even prior to the collision, the RAN was under increasing public and parliamentary scrutiny (Frame 1992). [38], A post-mortem conducted on Stevens' body showed a blood alcohol level of 0.025%, though the significance of this figure was challenged by expert witnesses. Furthermore, these deaths were not ‘a sacrifice for the country’s defence … [but resulted] from human error or negligence’ (Frame 1992). [6] During a series of manoeuvres beginning at 8:40 pm, which were intended to reverse the courses of both ships onto a northward heading of 020°, Voyager ended up to starboard of Melbourne. Ferry, D. (2004). This field is for validation purposes and should be left unchanged. During the day of 10 February the ships operated independently, or exercised with the British submarine HMS Tabard. Melbourne impacted just aft of Voyager's bridge structure; the destroyer rolled to starboard before she was cut in half. She was cut in two and sunk, and 82 of her crew killed. The second Royal Commission was driven by parliamentary backbench campaigning against a reluctant Government and Naval Board (McCarthy 2015). "The Era of Forward Defence". Frame (1992) highlights the separation of the RAN from government; independence the RAN viewed as strength. Where did the investigation fail?". It also contentiously held Melbourne’s Command Team partially responsible for failing to prevent the collision, leading to the Captain’s resignation (Spicer 1964). Pictures show the ill-fated destroyer H.M.A.S. John Jess MP fought for justice for dead and living following HMAS Voyager tragedy. [61], Ferry favours the opinion that Voyager misjudged the manoeuvring room she had. Trust in the organisation and its self–management was quickly eroding. This was only one aspect of the significant cultural change the RAN underwent. the sea room required for the destroyer to manoeuvre was miscalculated, the level of training aboard one or both ships was deficient, or. 367–73. There was minimal post-collision mental care or recognition of trauma. Finally, the RAN is judged on the manner in which it treats individuals involved. [66] A further 50 cases were closed in 2007 following mediation. Similarly, Captains were under more stringent medical reviews (Frame 1992). pp. [13] Messages were sent to the Fleet Headquarters in Sydney immediately after the collision, although they initially underestimated the extent of the damage to Voyager. The Canberra Times (ACT : 1926 - 1995), Wed 12 Feb 1964, Page 25 - Full List Of Dead And Missing From Voyager You have corrected this article This article has been corrected by You and other Voluntroves … [24] The Commission, to be headed by Sir John Spicer, was announced by Menzies on 13 February 1964. Mr Justice George Lucas as presiding Commissioners investigating the claims made by Cabban. For example, a clear zone was established 2000 yards ahead of the carrier which escorts were not to enter without express permission and turns toward Melbourne to take up station were prohibited (Oxenbould 2004). In Stevens, David. [2] Melbourne was heavily upgraded in order to operate jet aircraft, and became only the third aircraft carrier in the world to be constructed with an angled flight deck. With ActingCaptain GJB Crabb,DSC, RAN as her first commanding officer, HMAS Voyager (II) was commissioned into service in a traditional ceremony on 12 February 1957. pp. Twenty four hours later two of those crews had saved the lives of seventy men from HMAS Voyager. HMAS Voyager. The collision heavily damaged trust in the RAN and its standing with the Government and Australian public. [21] Swan and Torrens entered service in 1970 and 1971 respectively. Safety and rescue also became a higher priority; on the night, poor swimming ability likely led to several deaths and helicopter rescue was underused (Ferry 2014). This podcast series examines Australia’s Naval history, featuring a variety of naval history experts from the Naval Studies Group and elsewhere. The need for the RAN to have stronger relationships with government and be more aware of civilian processes was evident. From the Archives, 1964: Hope Fades for 85 Missing Men The collision of HMAS Melbourne and HMAS Voyager is the Royal Australian Navy's worst peacetime disaster. Whereas previously a Captain was rarely questioned and had almost autonomous power, all members of the bridge were encouraged to raise any concerns (Ferry 2014). Produced by the Naval Studies Group in conjunction with the … [5], At 390 feet (120 m) in length, Voyager displaced 2,800 tons (standard), and had a maximum speed of 34.75 knots (64.36 km/h; 39.99 mph). [46] This was a legal drug at the time and was carried in RAN ships' medical lockers. Ferry, D., 2014, HMAS Melbourne/Voyager collision: cause theories and inquiries (with aspects of the HMAS Melbourne/USS Frank E. Evans collision), Headmark, 151, p 2-16. [1], The carrier was 701 feet 5 inches (213.79 m) long, had a displacement of 15,740 tons, and could reach a speed of 24 knots (44 km/h; 28 mph). Monday 10 February 2014 marks the 50 th anniversary of a momentous event in Royal Australian Navy (RAN) history, the loss of the destroyer HMAS Voyager II following a collision with the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne II. HMAS Voyager was a Daring class destroyer of the Royal Australian Navy (RAN), that was lost in a collision in 1964. [9] At the same time, Stevens gave the order "Full ahead both engines. [7] Frame states that for this theory to be plausible, the entire bridge crew had to lose the tactical picture at the same time, which he considered to be too improbable. [1] The carrier's air group consisted of de Havilland Sea Venom fighter-bombers, Fairey Gannet anti-submarine strike aircraft, and Westland Wessex helicopters. Hobbs, Commander David (October 2007). [1][2] Work was suspended at the end of World War II, and did not resume until the Australian government purchased her and sister ship HMAS Sydney in 1947. As with any serious maritime/naval accident, the Melbourne-Voyagercollision significantly damaged the RAN.
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